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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER J 
Petitioner and Appellee, : 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF i 
CORRECTIONS; SCOTT CARVER, i 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS; MIKE : 
SIBBETT, AND BOARD MEMBERS : 
THEREOF, : 
Respondents and Appellants. : 
Priority No. 13 
Case No. 940140 -- CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1994), which grants this 
court original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from "orders on 
petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons." Walker was originally committed to the Utah 
State Prison on a second-degree felony; therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction. 
1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court apply the correct standard of review to 
Walker's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue could not have been preserved, because Walker's 
writ is not a "quasi-appellate review". 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is a legal conclusion that this court 
can review for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994), Termunde v. Cookf 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990). 
STATUTES 
All relevant statutes are attached to this brief in Addendum 
A. 
REQUEST FOR WRITTEN OPINION AND NO ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Appellee requests only a written opinion. This is not a 
case of first impression that has not been ruled on before. The 
writ process is, pursuant to both case law and U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions, not an appeal, or a "quasi-appellate review". 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Walker filed this petition for extraordinary relief after the 
Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole on August 3, 1993. 
An evidentiary hearing was held wherein Walker was charged with the 
parole violation of aggravated robbery. Following an Evidentiary 
Hearing, the Board of Pardons found (on August 3, 1993) that Walker 
committed the offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
Walker was originally convicted of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, but the conviction was reversed, and a new trial ordered. 
The criminal court, Judge Glenn Iwasaki, subsequently dismissed 
the criminal charges. 
Walker did plead guilty to failure to reside at his listed 
address, which is a technical violation of parole. 
Prior to the robbery conviction being overturned, (February 
25, 1993), and prior to the trial court dismissing the robbery 
charge, Walker did plead guilty, at a parole hearing, to having 
been convicted of aggravated robbery, and having been convicted of 
an habitual criminal offense. 
Following the dismissal by the criminal trial court, the Board 
of pardons filed a new charge against Walker: having committed the 
offense of aggravated robbery. Walker plead not guilty to this 
charge and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled, the result of 
which was to find Walker guilty of aggravated robbery. 
Walker's Rule 65B petition for extraordinary writ was filed, 
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claiming that there was not sufficient evidence to find he had 
committed aggravated robbery, even by a preponderance of the 
evidence. (see Writ, point 4, page 2). 
The transcripts of the Evidentiary Hearing were attached to 
the writ, but not the criminal trial transcript, because, by 
stipulation of counsel, the entire criminal trial transcript was 
never admitted into evidence at the Evidentiary Hearing, only that 
portion of the trial transcript which dealt with the testimony of 
Toni Christensen and Rex Christensen. (See R. - "B Transcript 
Testimony from Criminal Trial11 and also transcript of Evidentiary 
Hearing, page 37, and page 197, ffI,d simply submit Toni 
Christensen's testimony.."). 
In his writ, Walker provided complete evidence to Judge 
Iwasaki, who was already familiar with the criminal robbery charge, 
having heard been the judge who the matter at the criminal trial 
level. 
The trial court granted Walker's writ, as to the aggravated 
robbery charge, finding that there was insufficient evidence before 
the Board of Pardons for the Board to convince Walker of aggravated 
robbery. The trial court examined the finding of guilty by the 
Board, "in light of the standard used by the Board of Pardons". 
See minute entry dated 11-30-93, and attached hereto as Addendum 
C.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Board of Pardons held an evidentiary hearing on the charge 
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of aggravated robbery, on February 25, 1993 and March 22, 1993. 
At the criminal trial, held before Judge Iwasaki, Tony 
Christensen had given testimony damaging to Walker. At the 
evidentiary hearing only the trial transcript as it related to the 
testimony of Tony Christensen and Rex Christensen was admitted into 
evidence. The entire trial transcript was never admitted into 
evidence. See evidentiary transcript, page 37, and page 197, "I'd 
simply submit Toni Christensen's testimony.."). In addition the 
Amended Findings of the Board (See R. - "B Transcript Testimony 
from Criminal Trial1) indicate that the only portion of the trial 
transcript considered was the testimony of Tony Christensen. 
However, at the evidentiary hearing, an affidavit from Tony 
Christensen was introduced which recanted the earlier trial 
testimony. In addition, there was testimony from witnesses James 
Esparza, (an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of 
Utah), who testified that Tony Christensen had recanted her trial 
testimony, (see transcript of evidentiary at page 233, 234, 235) 
Robert Archuleta, (an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
state of Utah), also testified that Tony Christensen had recanted 
her testimony to him. (see transcript of evidentiary hearing at 
page 254) 
The Board specifically disregarded the eyewitness 
identification testimony, from witness who had been employed by 
Taco Bell. (R. 16-17). However, even though the Board found that 
the eyewitness testimony should be disregarded, much of the 
"findings" relied on the "disregarded" testimony, as to the 
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descriptions and identification of Walker. 
The Board,s findings of fact were flawed and not sufficient 
to support a finding of guilty, even at the preponderance level, 
for example: 
1. The "Finding" that two days before the robbery Walker asked 
Toni Christensen to get him a gun was not supported at any level of 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The gun was not introduced, 
Walker did not testify and Tony Christensen's testimony had been 
recanted. Linda Rice testified at the evidentiary hearing that she 
was in St. George at the time period of the events of the robbery, 
and no evidence was introduced to disprove or discredit her 
testimony. ( T of evidentiary at 179). The finding was based upon 
the trial transcript testimony of Tony Christensen only. 
2. The "Finding" regarding the silver-colored revolver was not 
based upon any information produced at the evidentiary hearing. 
3. The testimony of the employees of the Taco Bell was 
specifically determined to be "tainted" (R 16-17), the Board 
disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification, and yet 
somehow "found" (R-13) that Walker matched the robber's 
description, even though the robber wore a mask and no evidence was 
introduced (and subsequently accepted) to identify Walker as the 
robber. 
4. The Board's findings included the fact that it was the 
practice of Taco Bell employees to place loose change in rolls 
wrapped in "Taco Bell" wrappers, and yet no "wrappers" were 
introduced and no evidence was introduced linking Walker to a Taco 
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Bell wrapper. 
5. The Board's findings included the fact that the robber 
drove away in a car identified as belong to Thomas Bridwell, the 
brother of Walker's girlfriend, Linda Rice. However, no evidence 
was ever introduced linking Walker to the car which the robber 
drove away. No fingerprints were introduced linking Walker to the 
car and no witness was introduced who ever saw Walker drive the 
car, at any time. 
The state's Brief at page eight states that "Shelly Manwell 
testified...." Shelly Manwell never testified at Walker's trial, no 
testimony of "Shelly Manwell" was admitted to the evidentiary 
hearing, and the Findings of Fact do not mention Shelly Manwell. 
Shelly Manwell did not testify at Walker's evidentiary hearing. 
The Brief of the State is factually inaccurate in regards to Shelly 
Manwell. There is no cite to the record because there is no record 
to support the state's representation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant would ask the court to change the availability 
and application of the writ, and make it an appeal's review 
process. To grant such relief would be to change the essence of 
the writ process. The Declaration of Rights of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, section 5, specifically prohibits such 
restrictions of relief. 
The trial court (Judge Iwasaki) correctly found that even 
using the "preponderance level" there was insufficient evidence to 
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convince Walker of aggravated robbery. The trial court examined 
the entire transcript of the evidentiary hearing, and was familiar 
with the criminal trial, because Judge Iwasaki was the judge at the 
criminal trial, in which the charges were dismissed. Judge Iwasaki 
was familiar with the case, and able to make a fair review of the 
evidentiary hearing, and more able than any other individual to 
compare the trial court testimony of Tony Christensen, to the 
affidavits submitted at the evidentiary hearing, and the testimony 
of attorney's Esparza and Archuleta, as well as the testimony of 
Linda Rice. 
Walker's rule 65 B petition is not a request for an appellate-
style review, and there is no support, either statutory or in case 
law, to sustain Appellant's contention that trial courts are 
appeal's court's for the purposes of examination of an 
extraordinary writ. Walker's writ is a claim of violation of due 
process. However, even if it had been an appellate review, Walker 
did marshal evidence to support and demonstrate clear error on the 
part of the Board. 
Walker provided the trial court with a complete record, 
because the entire trial transcript was never admitted. The 
state's claim that the Board's decision was made on the entire 
trial transcript is unsupported. However, if the Board did make 
it's decision based upon the entire trial transcript there was 
clear error, even without the transcript being submitted, because 
the entire transcript was never admitted into evidence. 
Even if the trial court's burden was to make a determination 
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as to whether or not the findings established the elements of 
aggravated robbery by the constitutional burden of proof applicable 
to the revocation proceedings, then the trial court met it's 
burden. The trial court found that it's decision to grant the writ 
was made in "the light of the standard used by the Board of 
Pardons" (Minute entry 11-30-93, paragraph 5). 
The trial court (in hearing writs) is not the Utah court of 
Appeals and counsel for the Appellants did not cite to one Utah 
code section, or case, to support such a contention. 
ARGUMENT 
THE WRIT PROCESS CANNOT BE CHANGED TO A 
"QUASI-APPELLATE" REVIEW 
The writ process is special and The Declaration of Rights of 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 5, expressly prohibits 
restrictions on the availability of the Writ except "when the 
public safety requires it." That provision states: 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the 
public safety requires it. 
This provision of the Utah Constitution is essentially 
identical to Article I, section 9 of the United States 
Constitution. Appellant's brief sets forth the concept that the 
trial court is only a "quasi-appellate" review body of the Board's 
revocation proceedings. Such a notion essentially suspends the 
writ process for Walker, and limits the writ to an appellate review 
process only. Appellant's contention that the writ is simply a 
9 
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 quasi-appellate review" totally ignores the concept and purpose of 
a writ, which is to examine a situation and grant relief "where no 
other plain speedy and adequate remedy is available". Rule 65B(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
As a general matter, a writ of habeas corpus is not a 
substitute for an appeal, especially for ordinary types of trial 
error that are not likely to affect the outcome of a trial. Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); Andrews v. Shulsen, 94 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (October 27, 1988); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983); 
If, by case law, the writ is not a substitute for appeal, then 
Walker could hardly have declared it so, when he filed his writ. 
Appellant contends that the decision of the Board is res judicata, 
and that the writ is simply a "quasi-appellate review". 
Protection of life and liberty from unconstitutional 
procedures is of greater importance than is res judicata. In 
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963), the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized the point by stating: "Conventional 
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or 
liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is 
alleged. . . . The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas . . . 
is inherent in the very role and function of the writ." 
In discussing the importance of the writ, the Supreme Court of 
Utah held in Martinez v. Smith. 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979), (Chief 
Justice Crockett, writing for the Court), stated: "Nevertheless, 
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however desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law should 
not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has 
resulted the [defendant) should be without remedy." Martinez, at 
702. 
An extraordinary writ, is not a request for appellate review. 
In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-23 (1967), 
the court observed "This proceeding is an attempt to do that which 
should not be done nor countenanced in our procedure: to turn 
habeas corpus into an appellate review." And, just as in Bryant, 
the Appellant attempts to do what the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, 
as well as case law specifically prohibit, that is turn a writ into 
an appellate review. A writ is either granted or denied, and then 
there may be an appellate review of that decision, but a writ is 
not a appellate review, nor is a writ a "quasi-appellate 
review". 
WALKER DID NOT REQUEST THE TRIAL COURT TO CONDUCT AN 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Walker never requested the trial court to conduct an appellate 
review, and such a contention is simply not supported by the 
record. Appellant makes the unsupported pronouncement and then 
cites to In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986) at 
page 1360. However, in Jones, a Writ of Certiorari was filed, 
pursuant to Rules 65B(b)(2) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 65B (e) (failing to comply with duty), does not apply 
because the issue was appeal of an unfair discharge. The court held 
11 
that the proper application was subject to Rule 65B (e). Appellant 
compares apples and oranges. In re Discharge of Jones, involves a 
specific application of Rule 65B (e) because of the nature of the 
litigation. It was not a parole violation hearing or a writ which 
dealt with the Board of Pardons. Not one of Appellant's cites 
regarding his contention that Walker's petition requested an 
appellate review dealt with a writ involving a review of the Board 
of Pardons. Certainly other writs have been filed and reviewed in 
the state of Utah prior to Walker, which involve the Board of 
Pardons, in which the standard of review was discussed. 
In Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1992), the court 
addressed the standard of review to be applied by the trial court, 
in extraordinary writs, and held that the trial court must apply 
the "law to the facts" and make a determination. Judge Iwasaki made 
a specific finding that he made his determination "in the light of 
the standard used by the Board of Pardons" (See Minute entry 11 -
30-93 addendum C). Judge Iwasaki applied the law to the facts, and 
made the appropriate determination. 
Appellant's contention that Walker failed to marshal the 
evidence is, at the least, misleading, and flatly untrue. Judge 
Iwasaki was the trial judge who heard all of the original 
testimony. In addition, the entire transcript was, by stipulation 
of both counsel, never admitted into evidence. See transcript of 
evidentiary, pages page 37, and page 197. Appellant assumes 
(incorrectly) that the Board's decision was based solely on the 
criminal trial testimony and "not the two days of hearing and 
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affidavits before the board11. See footnote 4, page 11 of the 
Appellant's brief. If such a statement were true, then the Board 
may be guilty of an even greater charge of abuse of discretion, and 
abuse of due process, if they actually held two days of evidentiary 
hearings, involving at least five attorney's many witnesses and 
then simply ignored the two days of hearing and evidence, and based 
it's decision solely on a document which was never even admitted 
into evidence. 
Such an assumption is unsupported by the evidence submitted 
by Walker (the transcript of the evidentiary hearing). The 
evidence marshalled by Walker and examined by the judge, but 
apparently never read in it's entirety by the Appellant. 
Appellant also cites to Crockett v Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 
(Utah App. 1992), to support his contention that Judge Iwasaki 
should have presumed the findings of the Board to be accurate and 
complete. The point of Walker's writ was that the findings were 
not based upon the record of the evidentiary hearing, and Walker 
then supplied the trial court the transcript of the hearing. The 
Appellant's reliance on Crockett is confusing. 
Crockett is a case decided by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
dealing with custody and divorce. Crockett is not a writ and does 
not address the special aspects of a writ. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 65B (a) is clear that an extraordinary writ is available 
"when no other plain speedy and adequate remedy is available". In 
Jrockett, the issue was custody/divorce, there was a trial and then 
an appeal was filed. To compare Crockett to Walker's writ and then 
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conclude that Walker failed to marshal1 the evidence and that the 
writ should have been denied is not on point, and is confusing and 
misleading. 
Judge Iwasaki stated that he had examined the transcripts, 
court file (see Order dated February 10, 1994, paragraph 12), but 
also reminded counsel at the hearing held January 24, 1994 that he 
was the trial judge who dismissed the charges, and knew the case 
very well. 
Appellant's argument hinges on his assumption that the trial 
court was bound to assume the "accuracy of the Board's findings" 
(Appellant's brief at 13), because Walker failed to marshall the 
entire trial transcript. The whole writ process, by definition is 
begun when one does not "accept" the findings of the Board. In 
addition, the entire trial transcript was never admitted into 
evidence, and the portions that were admitted were well described 
and discussed in the body of the evidentiary hearing. Walker could 
hardly be responsible to attach a document to his writ that was 
never admitted into evidence. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court is merely the 
Appeals court and must act as such. However, unconstitutional the 
concept, it also flies in the face of available case law. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has set forth instructions in other cases, which 
are on point and deal specifically with the trial court's purpose 
and charge in hearing writs which deal with the Board of Pardons. 
In Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court examined Foot's writ and made a determination that 
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each case (involving the Board) must be examined individually (by 
the trial court) and that the "facts concerning the procedures 
followed by the board are flushed out,". The Supreme Court then 
determined that, as a court of appeal, it was unable to "conduct a 
meaningful review of the board's actions or of petitioner's due 
process claims." Foote. 808 P.2d at 735. The Utah Supreme Court 
then referred the matter, (not back to the Utah Court of Appeals) , 
but to the "district court of Salt Lake County for appropriate 
proceedings." Id. Those "appropriate proceedings" were for the 
trial court flush out the facts concerning Foot's case and make 
findings based upon it's determination. The trial court was not 
given the instruction to conduct an appeals-type review of the 
Board, but to "flush out" the facts. That job falls to the appeals 
court system, not the trial court. Judge Iwasaki "flushed out" 
the facts in Walker's case and then made a decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court thus confirmed in Foote v. Board of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) that the purpose of the district, 
or trial court, is not to function as a court of appeals. 
The Appellant has not presented a case of first impression in 
which there has not been an opinion issued. If the question has 
not been asked before - it is because the answer was already plain 
on it's face. The Utah Supreme Court could not have sent the 
matter back to the "district court.... for appropriate proceedings" 
if the district court were simply a "quasi-appellate review" 
entity. Id. 
Other courts have examined the standards which should be 
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applied to trial court's which either grant or deny writs. The writ 
is older than the U.S. and Utah constitutions, and has historically 
been treated by the trial court's a a request for a re-examination 
of a case. Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-23 
(1967) (citations omitted); see also Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 
273, 409 P.2d 386, 387 (Utah 1989) (judgment not subject to attack 
except in the most unusual circumstances such as where "it would be 
wholly unconscionable not to re-examine conviction"). Similar 
language is also found in Hurst, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 
(Utah 1989), "[A] conviction may nevertheless be challenged by 
collateral attack in 'unusual circumstances,' that is where an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right has occurred." Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035. 
However, even if Walker had asked the trial curt to conduct a 
"quasi-appellate review", the same result would have been entered, 
which is to grant the writ. Pursuant to Ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d 
781, 782 (Utah 1978), "The plenary authority of the Board of 
Pardons should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of 
its rightful discretion." However, Judge Iwasaki clearly noted 
that he examined the facts, "in the light of the standard used by 
the board of pardons", and that the evidence was "Insufficient and 
conflicting". (Minute entry dated 11-30-93, paragraph 5) Clearly, 
Ward does not stand for the theory that the Board's decisions can 
never be disturbed, but that they should not be disturbed absent a 
clear abuse of discretion. Judge Iwasaki examined the evidence, 
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and made a finding that there was insufficient and conflicting 
evidence to find Walker guilty even at the level of preponderance 
used by the Board. The trial court's decision in Walker's case is 
not in conflict with Appellant's cite to Ward. Judge Iwasaki found 
that there was no substance to the evidence. The Appellant has 
made no showing that the findings of Judge Iwasaki were flawed. 
Even though Judge Iwasaki used the same level (preponderance) 
to examine Walker's charge, that the Board used, some of the Utah's 
surrounding states have held that the preponderance level is 
inappropriate when alleging that a parolee has committed a crime 
for which he has not been convicted. Our sister state Colorado has 
even affirmed that position in both case law and statute: 
when a parolee pleads not guilty to a parole violation 
complaint alleging commission of a crime for which he has not 
been convicted, then the authority seeking parole revocation 
has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the parolee committed the alleged offense" 
People v. White, 804 P.2d 247 (Colo.App. 1990). Thus, it may 
be possible that should Utah's preponderance rule be put to the 
test in the federal courts, (alleging a parole violation which is 
the commission of a crime for which the parolee has not been 
convicted), it would be found to be an violation of due process. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE APPEAL'S COURT IS TO 
REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS 
The standard of review for reviewing a dismissal, (or 
granting), of a habeas corpus petition is outlined in Waastaff v. 
17 
Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Bundy v. 
Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)): 
In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a habeas 
corpus petition, "we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we 
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein 
to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced 
that the writ should be granted. 
In Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 217 (Utah App. 
1991), this court found stated "[w]e will not reverse if the is a 
reasonable basis in the record to support the trial court's denial 
of the writ." It is also logical, that the process will not be 
reversed if there was a reasonable basis to grant the writ. 
Appellate court of other states have applied similar language 
in reviewing either a denial or grant of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. See Sheriff of Clark County v Spaanola, 706 p.2d 
840, 842 (Nev. 1985) (limited to a review of whether district court 
committed substantial error in granting relief). 
Under the Utah Constitution, the due process clause of 
article I, section 7 is "comprehensive in its application to all 
activities of state government." Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 808 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). What process is due in any given 
circumstance may vary, "but assuredly, the parole board is not 
outside the constitutional mandate that the actions of government 
must afford due process of law." Id. The process due at a board 
of pardons hearing can only be determined "after the facts 
concerning the procedures followed by the board are flushed [sic] 
out." Foote, 808 P.2d at 735. 
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On review of a denial of a petition for an extraordinary writ, 
the standard of review depends upon the issues presented on appeal. 
If the petition presents only questions of law, the court of 
Appeal's grants the trial court's conclusions no deference, 
reviewing them for correctness. Stewart v. State By and Through 
Deland, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah App. 1992). 
If, however, there are questions of fact, "we defer to the 
trial court's findings and will disturb those findings only if they 
are clearly erroneous." Id. Moreover, the record is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the findings and judgment, and if there is 
a reasonable basis to support the trial court's refusal to grant 
habeas corpus relief, then the Appeals court will affirm the trial 
court. Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord 
Baldwin v. State, 842 P.2d 927, 928 (Utah App. 1992). 
This court should review the findings of the trial court and 
affirm, unless the findings are clearly erroneous, if the court had 
been asked to review the writ. However, Appellant has requested 
the court to make a determination as to whether or not the writ 
process is a "quasi-appellate review". In this case, the court 
should determine that the writ process is not an appellate review, 
because of case law and constitutional prohibitions. 
CONCLUSION 
The narrow question presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Walker's case is whether or not the trial court should have (or 
could have) examined Walker's writ requesting extraordinary relief 
19 
from a Board Of Pardons decision in a "quasi-appellate review" 
manner. The answer is that both the U.S. and the Utah 
Constitutions specifically define an individual's right to seek 
relief via the writ process, as a special process set aside from 
the appeal's system, and case law in many states, and specifically 
in Utah have historically held that a writ is not an appeal and 
that the purpose of the writ process, at the trial court level, is 
to is to flush out the facts. 
The Appellant's request for relief should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^_>/_ day of February, 1995. 
Bt&KELOCK 
attorney for Thayne Walker 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead 
Corporation 
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LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. 930904964 HC 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al.. : 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Respondents. : 
The above-entitled matter came before this court on November 
11, 1993 and January 24, 1994. Respondents were represented by 
Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was 
present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. The court, 
having entered its ruling by minute entry on November 30, 1993, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Petitioner is lawfully imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for the crimes of robbery, a second degree felony and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony. These sentences are running consecutively. 
w?3 PiSTaiST MUST 
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2. Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not expire 
until November 2010. 
3. On July 25, 1989, Petitioner was paroled from the 
prison by order of the Utah Board of Pardons. 
4. On February 25, 1993, Petitioner received a parole 
revocation hearing before the Board that was continued on March 
29, 1993/ at which time, the Board heard testimony and received 
evidence on the allegations that Petitioner had violated his 
Parole Agreement. 
5. Subsequently, the Board found Petitioner guilty of 
violating his Parole Agreement by having committed the offense of 
aggravated robbery and by having failed to reside at his 
residence of record. 
6. The Board revoked Petitioner's parole date and ordered 
his re-incarceration at the prison based upon the violations. 
7. Written findings and conclusions were prepared by the 
Board detailing and explaining the Board's decision. 
8. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
on or about September 2, 1993, challenging the actions of the 
Board in revoking his parole. 
9. An evidentiary hearing was held before this court on 
November 11, 1993. 
10. On November 30, 1993, this court issued a minute entry 
2 
00090 
denying in part and granting in part, Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
11. Respondents' counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, requested a 
hearing and clarification on the minute entry of November 30, 
1993. Accordingly, on January 24, 1994, the court clarified its 
minute entry. 
12. The court found, after examination of the transcripts, 
the court's file, and counsels' arguments, that there was 
insufficient and evidence before the Board to find that 
Petitioner committed the crime of aggravated robbery. 
13. Specifically, the court found that the affidavits and 
testimony from Toni Christensen and Linda Rice conflicted with 
the testimony at trial and based upon those conflicts, the Board 
had insufficient evidence to conclude Petitioner committed the 
offense of aggravated robbery. 
14. However, based on the uncontested admissions of 
Petitioner, the court found sufficient evidence for the Board to 
revoke Petitioner's parole based upon the violation of failing to 
reside at a residence of record. 
Having made the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the 
court orders the following: 
1. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3 
2. Petitioner's requested relief is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. The Board shall reconsider Petitioner's case in light 
of the court's ruling-* and shall act accordingly. 
DATED this I (/ day of February, 1994. 
BY THE^CDURTJ 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATg QF mibWG 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to David S. Steed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER, THAYNE L 
vs 
PLAINTIFF 
STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. BLAKELOCK, ROSEMOND G. 
D. ATTY. MILLER, LORENZO K 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 930904964 HC 
DATE 11/30/93 
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK KRB 
AND WAS A DECISION REACHED BY THE BOARD WILL WITHIN THEIR 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS, NOT SUBJECT TO COURT REVIEW; 
6) WHAT EVER ALTERNATIVE RELIEF PETITIONER WOULD REQUEST OF 
THE BOARD PURSUANT TO THIS DECISION IS UP TO HIM. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED IN PART AND 
GRANTED IN PART. 
MR. MILLER IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE THE OR©3R. 
<>. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER, THAYNE L 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. BLAKELOCK, ROSEMOND G. 
D. ATTY. MILLER, LORENZO K 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 930904964 HC 
DATE 11/30/93 
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK KRB 
THIS MATTER'WAS HEARD BY THE COURT ON 11/15/93 9 9 AM. 
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, ROSEMOND 
BLAKELOCK; RESPONDENT WAS REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT AG, 
LORENZO MILLER. AFTER HEARING ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES ON 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, THE COURT TOOK THE MATTER UNDER 
ADVISEMENT IN ORDER TO EXAMINE EXHIBITS "A" AND "B" OF THE 
PETITION. EXHIBIT "A" IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PETITIONER'S 
EVID. HEARING HELD 2/25/93; EXHIBIT "B" IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF 
THE PETITIONER'S EVID. HEARING OF 5/29/93. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW 
OF THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE FILE AND THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL, THE 
COURT FINDS: 
1) PETITIONER IS LAWFULLY CONFINED AT THE USP FOR THE CRIMES 
OF ROBBERT A 2ND DEGREE FELONY AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A 3RD DEGREE FELONY, THE 
SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY; 
2) PETITIONER'S SENTENCES WILL NOT EXPIRE UNTIL NOV., 2010; 
3) THAT BEGINNING 2/25/93 AND CONTINUING ON 3/29/93, THE 
BOARD TOOK EVIDENCE ON PETITIONER'S PAROLE OF 7/25/89 REGARDING 
ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS AND POSSIBILITY OF REVOKING SAID 
PAROLE; 
4) PURSUANT TO SAID EVID. HEARING, THE BOARD FOUND 
PETITIONER TO BE IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, I.E., 
PETITIONER FAILED TO RESIDE AT A RESIDENCE OF RECORD AND 
HAVING COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF AGG. ROBBERY AND REVOKED HIS 
PREVIOSLY GRANTED PAROLE: 
5) AFTER EXAMINATION OF THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE FILE AND 
COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS, THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT AND CONFLICTING EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BOARD TO FIND 
THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF AGG. ROBBERY. THIS 
FINDING IS MADE IN LIGHT OF THE STANDARD USED BY THE BOARD OF 
PARDONS. HOWEVER, THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT PETITIONER 
ADMITTED TO THE OTHER VIOLATION WHICH IN AND OF ITSELD ENABLED 
THE BOARD TO REVOKE PETITIONER'S PAROLE DATE. THE DECISION TO 
REVOKE WAS BASED UPON PETITIONER'S ADMISSION TO THE ALLEGATION 
Case No: 930904964 HC 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the 30 day of l^f?;, , m^. 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
THAYNE L WALKER 
Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH DEPT OF CORRECTI 
Defendant 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK 
Atty for Plaintiff 
COTTON TREE SQUARE SUITE 9-D 
2230 NORTH UNIVERSITY PARKWAY 
PROVO UT 84604 






BOARD MEMBERS THEREOF 
Defendant 
LORENZO K MILLER 
Atty for Defendant 
330 SOUTH 300 EAST 
2ND FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111-252 
District Court Clerk 
By: C(("? ^L. 
Deputy Clerk 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Hatter of the Alleged AMENDED 
Parole Violation of FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
USP #13057 
INTRODUCTION 
Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violating hie parole by (I) having 
failed to reside at a residence of record, and (2) having committed the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery. Mr. Walker pled guilty to the residence 
violation and not guilty to the allegation of Aggravated Robbery, and an 
Evidentiary Hearing was scheduled on this latter charge. 
Ou February 25, 1993, the matter came on for hearing before the Board of 
Pardons, and again on March 29, 1993, Board members sitting were Curtis L. 
Garner and Cheryl Hansen. Parolee Thayne Walker was present and represented 
by counsel Mark Stringer. The State was represented by Assistant Attorney 
General Ralph Adam*. After hearing the evidence, the stipulations of the 
parties and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised herein, the 
Board now finds Thayne Larry Walker in violation of his parole by having 
failed to reside at a residence of record, and by having committed the offense 
of Aggravated Robbery, and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which constitute the decision of the Board: 
FIMDIHGS OF FACT 
1. Thayne Larry Walker was paroled from the Utah State Prison on July 
25, 1989. 
2. On or about July 27, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker left his residence of 
record without notifying Adult Probation and Parole, and thereafter failed to 
notify Adult Probation and Parole of his residence. 
3* On or about August 16, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker asked Toni 
Christensen to get him a gun so that he could "make some money". 
4. On or about August 16, 1989, and in response to Mr. Walker's request, 
Toni Chriatensen rode with Mr. Walker and Mr. Walker'a girlfriend, Linda Rice, 
to the home of Ms. Chrisleusen's father, in Murray, Utah. There she obtained 
her fatherfs silver-colored revolver and gave it to Mr. Walker. THe three of 
them traveled to this location in Linda Rico's blue Toyota automobile. 
5. On or about August 18, 1939, at approximately 9:30 p.m., a Taco Bell 
restaurant, located at 4199 South Redwood Road, Murray, Utah, was robbed. The 
robber, who was wearing a aki mask at the time, atood between 6V and 6'4" i * 0 0 0 1 r 
height, had blue ayea with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond v v v * 
6. During the robbery* the robber pointed his gun at Ms. Beid. Be told 
her not to try anything or he would kill her. Be walked directly to the safe, 
removed the lid, and retrieved a money bag, which contained mostly loose 
change, fie then motioned with his gun for Ms. Reid to walk to the cash 
register. She did so and gave him the money from the register. Be took it, 
said "thank you," and ran from the restaurant out the back door. 
7. At the time of the robbery it was the ordinary practice of Taco Bell 
employees to place loose coins in rolls wrapped in 'Taco Bell1* paper, and then 
to place these in the safe. It is probable, but not certain, that such rolls 
were in the Taco Bell aafe at the time of the robbery. 
8. Upon leaving the Taco Bell, the robber ran to a blue Toyota, Utah 
license plate number 719BDP, and entered the passenger side. The car then 
fled at a high rate of speed. 
9. On the date of the robbery, Utah license plate number 719DP was 
registered to a blue Toyota, owned by Thomas Bridwell. 
10. Thomas Bridwell is the brother of Linda Rice. 
11. Linda Rice was and is Thayne Larry Walker's girlfriend. She 
regularly drove her brother's blue Toyota. 
12. Thayne Larry Walker resided with Linda Rice following his absconsion 
from parole supervision. 
13. From observation at the hearing, the Board notes that Thayne Larry 
Walker stands approximately 6V2" tall, has light brown or sandy blond hair, 
and blue eyes with wrinkles around them. 
14. At approximately 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. on August 18, 1989, Thayne Larry 
Walker appeared at the apartment of Shelly Nanwell. He was carrying a 
moneybag which contained coin rolls wrapped in plastic with 'Taco Bell11 on 
them. He also carried the gun which he had received from Toni Chris tens en two 
days previous. He was wearing levis and tennis shoes. He was vVet9>, appeared 
nervous, entered the residence shortly thereafter and also appeared upset. 
She stated that she felt "they" had been seen, and that aha had hidden her car. 
15* To the extent that the testimony of any witness is not in accord 
with the findings herein, it is not credited. Any Conclusion of Law which 
should be deemed a Finding of Fact ia hereby adopted as such. 
BV1DKNTIARI DISCUSSION 
A. gygwitngge Testification 
At the hearing, defense counsel made two motions in limine relating to 
State1s evidence of eyewitness identification. 
First, the defense moved that the Board either recuse itself entirely in 
this matter, or in the alternative that it bifurcate the hearing to make a 
preliminary determination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony, and that those Board members Baking this initial determination then 
recuse themselves from further sitting in this matter. Counsel cited State v. 
fiAOilfili 817 P. 2d 774, 780-784 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that the 0 0 0 1 
distinction between judge and jury must be preserved when dealing with the 
foundation for eyewitness identification, and that the ultimate finder of fact 
must not paas on questions of admissibility* This motion was denied. 
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Next the defense moved to dismiss all charges against Thayne Larry 
Walker. The motion was based on the argument that admission of eyewitness 
testimony impermissibly tainted under Eanirar would constitute a violation of 
due process, and that if such evidence were excluded, the State would have no 
case. This motion was also denied. 
During the hearing, and over defense objections, the Board allowed 
eyewitnesses to the robbery to identify Thayne Larry Walker as the robber. 
The Board permitted such testimony on the ground that (1) the Rsmlrtg 
requirement of an independent determination as to admissibility applies to 
jury, not bench trials; end (2) parole revocation hearings are "informal" 
proceedings at which formal rules of evidence do not apply and in which any 
evidentiary problems normally go to weight, rather than admissibility. At the 
conclusion of the State's case* however9 the Board determined that the 
eyewitness testimony was in fact impermissibly tainted by the witnesses1 prior 
exposure, both live and photographic, to Mr. Walker. The Board therefore 
disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification in reaching it's 
decision. 
B Transcript Tgctlnonv from Criminal Trial 
At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel alio made a motion in 
limine to suppress as hearsay all transcript testimony from Mr. Walker's 
criminal trial. This motion was denied. Later, during the hearing, the Board 
received into evidence transcripts of trial testimony by Toni Ghrietensen over 
a renewed hearsay objection. This objection was overruled and the evidence 
was received based upon (1) the admissibility of hearsay in parole violation 
proceedings (Utah Admin. R. 671-508-(E))f and (2) the Board's finding that Ms. 
Christensen was unavailable as a witness (Utah R. Evid., 604). 
C. Credibility of Ton! Christeneen Beer««y Documents 
Following the admission of Toni Christensen's trial testimony, the Board 
allowed the defense-to introduce a notarised affidavit by Ms. Christensen in 
which she arguably contradicts her testimony at trial. In the affidavit, she 
states that she had used drugs and alcohol at some unspecified time prior to 
the trialt and that she testified as she did at the trial due to her fear of 
possible criminal prosecution* The affidavit does not specify in what manner, 
if any, her trial testimony was incorrect; rather, it merely states that ahe 
could no longer recall the events of August, 1989. 
A companion affidavit by attorney Robert Archuleta, as well as his 
testimony at the hearing, amplifies somewhat on the Toni Christensen 
affidavit. Mr, Archuleta atates that Toni Chris tensen told him that ahe was a 
drug addict and was alcohol-intoxicated at the time of her trial testimony and 
that she testified as she did at trial because ahe was mad at Linda Rice, ahe 
feared criminal prosecution unless ahe cooperated, she feared losing her 
children to the State if she did not cooperate, and she expected some form of 
monetary compensation in exchange for her testimony. 
The Board finds Ms. Christeneeu'e affidavit testimony to be less reliable 
than that offered at trial. In making this determination, we consider a 
number of factors: 
Firstf the trial testimony was given in a courtroom eetting where the ' 
witness1a demeanor was on display and where ahe was aubiect to examin***** K« 
Second, the trial testimony is clear, detailed, and cones directly from 
the mouth of the witness herself. The affidavit, by contrast, is brief, 
somewhat vague and was drafted for her by Mr. Walkerfa criminal attorney. 
Third, the trial testimony is consistent with an independant account 
given by Ms. Christensen to Murray Police Detective Glover. The affidavit is 
not* 
Fourth, the affidavit was not executed until approximately 24 months 
after the trial. 
Fifth, Toni Christensen was hostile toward Linda Rice (Mr. Walker's 
girlfriend) at the time of trial and was cross-examined concerning this. She 
was further cross-examined regarding her drug and alcohol uee. By the time 
she met with Mr. Walker1a attorney to prepare the affidavit, however, ahe had 
reconciled with Ms. Rice to the point that Ms. Rice was present with her at 
the time of the attorneyfs interview. Further, it was the impression of one 
of the attorneys in attendance that the women had been drinking together for 
an extended period* Thus a legitimate question ariaes whether Toni 
Christensen was pressured into making the affidavit in a moment of imparled 
judgment. Unfortunately, the State has had no opportunity to explore these 
possibilities with the witness on cross-examination. 
Rased upon these considerations, insofar as the trial testimony and 
affidavit are in conflict, the Board finds the trial testimony more credible. 
D. Credibility of Linda Rice 
Defense witness Linda Rice testified at the hearing that ahe had no 
independent knowledge of the August 18th Robbery, or of who committed it. The 
Board finds this aspect of Ms. Rice's testimony lacking in credibility, baaed 
upon at least three considerations; 
First, Ms. Rice's demeanor at the hearing was unconvincing. During her 
testimony, ahe avoided eye contact with the Board, frequently appeared 
uncertain aa to how to testify, and seemed uncomfortable, shifting frequently 
in her seat during cross-examination. Occasionally ahe would turn to look at 
Mr. Walker before answering State counsel's questions. 
Second, Ms. Rice has a motive to lie. She was herself originally charged 
criminally along with Mr. Walker, and ahe admits that ahe wants their romance 
to continue whenever he is released from prison. 
Third, at least some of her testimony is implausible, which casts a cloud 
of doubt upon the remainder. For example, her story that ahe never diecueaed 
Toni Christensen's prior testimony with her, nor what Mr. Christensen might 
say in a subsequent affidavit, strikes us aa highly unlikely, given Ms. Rice's 
obvious interest and opportunity to discuss this. 
CONCLUSION OF XAW 
1. Thayne Larry Walker was lawfully paroled. 
2. Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violation of hit parole. 
3. Thayne Larry Walker waa afforded all of his Constitutional and 
Statutory righta and privileges. 
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4. The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Larry Thayne Walker violated his parole* 
3* Thayne Larry Walker did in fact violate bis parole by failing to 
reside at a residence of record and by cotomitting the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, the coonission of the Robbery having been established at the 
Evidentiary Bearing htrein* 
6. Either of said violations is individually sufficient, without the 
otherf to revoke the Parole of Thayne Larry Walker. 
7. Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is 
hereby adopted as such. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted Thayne Larry Walker on the 25th 
day of July, 1989, be and the sasre is hereby revoked. The isatter will be 
ahceduled for a Rehearing in September, 1996. 
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This is to certify that on the 3rd day of August, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law was sent via fax transmission, pre-paid, to: 
1-375-0704: 
Hark Stringer 
Attorney at Law 
Cotton Tree Square, Suite 9-D 
2230 North University Avenue Parkway 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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